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When does charisma matter for top-level leaders?  
Effect of attributional ambiguity 
 
One stream of leadership theory suggests leaders are evaluated via inferential observer processes 
that compare the fit of the target to a prototype of an ideal (charismatic) leader. Attributional 
theories of leadership suggest that evaluations depend on knowledge of past organizational 
performance, which is attributed to the leader’s skills. We develop a novel theory showing how 
inferential and attributional processes simultaneously explain top-level leader evaluation and 
ultimately leader retention and selection. We argue that observers will mostly rely on 
attributional mechanisms when performance signals clearly indicate good or poor performance 
outcomes. However, under conditions of attributional ambiguity (i.e., when performance signals 
are unclear), observers will mostly rely on inferential processes. In Study 1 we tested our theory 
in an unconventional context—the U.S. presidential election—and found that the two processes, 
due to the leader’s charisma and country economic performance, interact in predicting whether a 
leader is selected. Using a business context and an experimental design, in Study 2 we show that 
CEO charisma and firm performance interact in predicting leader retention, confirming the 
results we found in Study 1. Our results suggest that this phenomenon is quite general and can 
apply to various performance domains.  
 
 
Keywords: Inferences; Attributions; Performance signals; Charisma; Econometric models; 
Attributional ambiguity; Heuristics; Leadership; Leader selection; U.S. Presidents; Obama; 
Romney; Elections; Forecasting; Upper echelons. 
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Broadly defined, organizations—whether entities or institutions like firms or nation states 
(Hodgson, 2006)—have leaders at their helms. What psychological processes explain how these 
top-level leaders are evaluated and selected? We advance a novel theory by combining two 
psychological explanations: Inferential and attributional. Top-level leaders are selected because 
of (a) how leader-like they seem, and (b) the performance of their organization, which is causally 
attributed to them. Via these two signaling channels, selectors have some stereotypical cues 
about future organizational performance. Selectors, particularly in limited information conditions, 
intuitively believe that the more an individual is leader-like and/or the better the performance of 
their organization, the more likely the leader will engender good future performance.  
The two psychological processes are well explained by current leadership theories. From an 
inferential perspective, the degree to which a leader’s characteristics resemble a prototypical 
leader imbues the target with leader-like qualities (Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984). One key 
quality, charisma—an attribute idealized across cultures (Den Hartog, House, Hanges, & Ruiz-
Quintanilla, 1999)—strongly predicts leader prototypicality per se (Antonakis, Fenley, & Liechti, 
2011) and objective outcomes (Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996). Another explanatory 
route is attribution theory: It suggests that organizational performance—a presumed indicator of 
the leader’s competence—determines how leaders will be evaluated (Calder, 1977; Lord, 
Binning, Rush, & Thomas, 1978; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). Thus, good performance is thought 
to be an outcome of effective leadership. This tendency is so deeply rooted that such attributions 
are made even when they are not warranted (Weber, Camerer, Rottenstreich, & Knez, 2001).  
Thus, leaders are positively evaluated if they act leader-like and obtain good performance. A 
leader doing a “good” job will be re-appointed; a leader doing a “poor” job will be replaced 
(Hilger, Mankel, & Richter, 2013). Of course, observers, particularly distant ones, cannot know 
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everything about the leader, if organizational performance is good or poor, or whether the leader 
was responsible for the performance. Observers lack full information; yet they have to make a 
heuristic decision under conditions of uncertainty (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
The two psychological processes reflect different mechanisms and profoundly different 
approaches to understanding leadership. The first, which is leader-centric, argues that leaders, 
particularly charismatic ones are highly influential and affect organizational outcomes. The 
second, a follower-centric perspective, states that leadership is a social construction; observers 
use organizational outcomes, whether or not caused by the leader, to decide if a leader is 
effective (Meindl, 1990). Current theory has not reconciled these two processes (cf. Day & Lord, 
1988; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). Do both processes matter for top-level leadership? Might the 
processes “work together” in explaining leader selection? We seek to answer these questions by 
advancing a hybrid theory of leader evaluation and consequently selection. We focus on top-
level leaders and how they are evaluated by selectors, because of the impact such leaders can 
have on collectives (House, Spangler, & Woycke, 1991; Jones & Olken, 2005). 
Our contribution is threefold. First, we will reconcile (a) inferences made about leaders’ 
characteristics, providing indications of how effective they may be, with (b) attributions about 
the performance of the leader’s organization, providing indications of how effective the leaders 
have been (cf. Erickson & Krull, 1999)
1
. Although inferences or attributions about target leaders 
have been examined extensively in laboratory settings (e.g., Awamleh & Gardner, 1999; Howell 
& Frost, 1989; Rush, Thomas, & Lord, 1977), they have not been studied simultaneously or in 
terms of how leaders are selected in consequential roles. The CEO selection and succession 
                                                 
1
 Note, we use the terms “inferences” and “attributions” as defined by Erickson and Krull (1999) who have argued 
that the terms refer to distinct decision-making processes: Inferences concern understanding the nature of an 
individual whereas attributions concern the cause of an outcome (see also Lord and Maher, 1994, who have used the 
terms recognition- and inference-based processes respectively).   
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literature, has focused on factors like firm performance and demographic characteristics (Datta & 
Guthrie, 1994, 1997), board composition and ownership (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993), board 
power (Zajac & Westphal, 1996), or on understanding how new CEOs affect strategic change in 
succession events (Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, & Greger, 2012). Both laboratory and field 
studies, however, have not modeled how inferential and attributional processes simultaneously 
affect selection decisions when attributional information is unclear. 
Second, apart from bridging two disparate theories, our key contribution is on the moderating 
effect of clarity of attributional information. When performance is clearly good (or bad) leader 
evaluations will ultimately be positive (or negative) largely irrespective of the leader’s charisma. 
Simply put leader charisma matters little if outcomes attributed to the leader send clear signals. 
However, in conditions of attributional ambiguity, where performance signals are inconclusive, 
this uncertainty will spur selectors to decide on the basis of inferential processes. In other words, 
the charismatic leader will shine when attributional information is nebulous.  
Third, in addition to testing our theory in a more conventional setting—the decision to retain 
a CEO—we use an unconventional context to demonstrate the general nature of our theory: The 
selection of the U.S. president. This extraordinary setting provides a controlled environment 
allowing for a direct test of our theory, as we explain in detail later. 
With respect to our contributions, it is important to briefly differentiate attributional 
ambiguity from Weberian (1947) notions of crisis, which can refer to: (a) bad organizational 
performance, or (b) times of turbulence or environmental volatility (Waldman, Ramirez, House, 
& Puranam, 2001) and this irrespective of organizational performance signals. Our focus is on 
the clarity of performance signals, which concerns the absence of a clear negative or positive 
organizational performance signal and does not necessarily reflect environmental volatility. 
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Charisma has been shown to matter most for firm performance in conditions of perceived 
environmental turbulence (Waldman et al., 2001); thus, the charismatic leader is seen as a savior 
for an organization operating in a risky environment. This phenomenon is different from what 
our theory explains. Our model suggests that charisma will matter most for leader selection when 
organizational performance is ambiguous, and this irrespective of environment volatility. 
In the next section, we build a general theory of leader selection—independent of the context 
in which we test it—by discussing how leaders are evaluated from a social-cognitive perspective. 
We focus on evaluations resulting from attributions on performance cues and from inferences 
based on prototypes of ideal leaders. As concerns the latter, we argue that charisma is a key 
characteristic of such prototypes and that charisma will likely matter a great deal in situations of 
attributional ambiguity. Then we highlight how our theory explains leader evaluation (i.e., 
retention and/or selection) in a political (Study 1) and a business (Study 2) context.  
EVALUATION OF LEADERS 
Attributions of Leadership and Performance Cues 
Building on Jones and Davis’ (1965) correspondence inference theory, Calder (1977) argued 
that attributions begin with observations of (a) the leader’s behaviors and (b) their outcomes (e.g., 
organizational performance). The outcome is attributed to the leader if behaviors are distinctive 
and not situational dependent. Thus, attributions are likely made when both behaviors and their 
effects are observable; however, departing from Jones-Davis (1965), Calder (1977) suggests that 
“individuals may also rely heavily on knowledge about effects which are associated with a 
person, even though the requisite behavior for these effects has not been observed” (p. 197).  
Theoretically, observers reason in a probabilistic way; they observe an event and attribute a 
cause to it if the event is representative of the cause (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, 
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organizational performance is representative of the leader’s competence; good organizational 
performance is attributed to effective leadership (Binning, Zaba, & Whattam, 1986; Calder, 1977; 
Lord & Maher, 1994). Observing unambiguous effects is sufficient to make attributional 
judgments (Calder, 1977), and this in a heuristic way. In the case of close leaders (information 
rich situation), judgments are probably made in a more controlled way especially when the 
context of the judgment is seen as important (cf. Martinko, Harvey, & Douglas, 2007).  
This attribution phenomenon is general. In a study of U.S. oil companies, CEO compensation 
increased following rises in firm profit, even though profits depended oil price fluctuations, 
which are mostly exogenous to the actions of any single CEO (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001). 
Business press articles about a U.S. airline deconstructed and reconstructed the CEO’s image to 
match the evolution of the firm’s performance (Chen & Meindl, 1991). These attributions apply 
too in the selection of CEOs where selectors scrutinize the organizational performance of the 
presiding CEO to see whether he or she should remain in office. If organizational performance is 
below par, outside candidates will be considered (Hilger et al., 2013), who in turn will have the 
performance of their companies scrutinized (Khurana, 2002). This process parallels what occurs 
in professional sports, where coaches are often fired following prolonged poor team performance. 
Interestingly, organizational performance is attributed to leaders even when performance is 
known to depend on exogenous factors (Weber et al., 2001). Thus, some scholars (Meindl & 
Ehrlich, 1987) state that leadership might simply be socially constructed and does not matter for 
organizational outcomes. Of course, although performance signals bias leaders evaluations, 
leaders still impact organizational performance (Jones & Olken, 2005; Lowe et al., 1996).  
In summary, the extent to which organizational performance is positive (or negative) will 
determine whether selectors will be positively (or negatively) predisposed to the leader; this 
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evaluation turn affect whether the leader is reselected. Thus, an incumbent leader will only be 
retained if performance has been good (Hilger et al., 2013).  
Hypothesis 1: Organizational performance signals will predict leader selection 
Note, we use the term “selection” in a broad sense to include leader selection and reselection (for 
incumbents) in cases of tournaments or retention at the helm of an organization or institution. 
Inferences of Leadership and Person Perception 
Similar to the intuitive attribution processes described above, individuals also judge leaders 
by relying on heuristics. The foundations of these inferential judgments are schemas—cognitive 
knowledge structures representing a concept along with its attributes and of the relations between 
these attributes and other concepts (Fiske, 1995). Schemas are developed with repeated exposure 
to common attributes that become indicative of a prototype. Once triggered schemas require little 
mental effort and convey configural information quickly (Fiske, 1995). Hence, individuals use 
slivers of information representative of a prototype to classify a target (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Only a few indicators (e.g., of charisma) are needed to be classified under a particular 
label (e.g., charismatic). Once classified, other indicators of the prototype, even though not 
observed directly, will be associated with the target (Cantor & Mischel, 1977). This process 
makes for a stable memory structure about the target on the particular label, directs attention, 
guides information encoding and memory, and influences judgments and attitudes (Fiske, 1995). 
Hence, individuals have implicit prototypes of leaders (Lord et al., 1984). For leadership at 
the upper echelons where there is a lack of information about what leaders are like, observers 
perceive leaders in idealized ways and are susceptible to classifying the leader following leader’s 
image building efforts (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002). Charisma is an important element used in 
leader image building; from a dramaturgical perspective, leaders construct their charisma via 
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impression management techniques and by packaging and communicating their message to the 
target audience in an attractive way (Gardner & Avolio, 1998). Such leaders are especially good 
communicators and use framing and scripting techniques to project vision (Gardner & Avolio, 
1998); these leaders typify what followers expect of them (Hogg, 2001), as we discuss next.  
The Importance of Charisma for the Leadership Prototype: Charisma is “symbolic leader 
influence rooted in emotional and ideological foundations” (Antonakis et al., 2011: 376). Such 
leaders are exceptionally expressive and inspiring (Gardner & Avolio, 1998) and “manifest and 
symbolize desired collective values” (Shamir, 1995: 40). They typify the prototypicality that 
followers seek; they are liked and influence followers because followers identify with them 
(Hogg, 2001). These leaders are able to articulate “an ideological vision . .  . [that engenders] a 
sense of identity with the collectivity” (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993: 585). Charismatic 
leaders make extensive use of articulation and impression management skills (Conger & 
Kanungo, 1987). These leaders are persuasive  and use image-building techniques to imbue 
themselves with charisma (House, 1977); the use of rhetorical strategies, is the key that “shapes 
the charismatic relationship” (Gardner & Avolio, 1998: 42). Charismatic leaders affect their 
followers through the message they deliver (Shamir et al., 1993), which stems “from nonverbal 
and verbal influencing tactics that reify the leader’s vision” (Antonakis et al., 2011: 376). 
Charismatic leaders use specific strategies in terms of what they say and how they say it. To 
create emotional links with their followers charismatic leaders state their moral conviction, sort 
wrong from right, communicate high and ambitious goals, as well as confidence that these can be 
achieved; they do this using rich but simple descriptions that trigger a vivid vision (Antonakis et 
al., 2011; Antonakis & House, 2002; House, 1977; House & Shamir, 1993; Shamir, Arthur, & 
House, 1994; Shamir et al., 1993). Doing so requires the leader to use rhetorical techniques 
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including metaphors, contrasts, lists, stories, and so forth (Den Hartog & Verburg, 1997; Frese, 
Beimel, & Schoenborn, 2003; House, 1977; Shamir et al., 1994), termed “charismatic leadership 
tactics,” which predict leader emergence and prototypicality (Antonakis et al., 2011).  
For example, the use of metaphors by U.S. presidents is correlated with ratings of charisma 
(Mio, Riggio, Levin, & Reese, 2005) and with ratings of their greatness by historians (Emrich, 
Brower, Feldman, & Garland, 2001). In experimental settings, researchers have found that 
perceptions of leader charisma and effectiveness are strongly influenced by the leader displaying 
a strong delivery style—both in terms of vocal fluency and of non-verbal behaviors (Awamleh & 
Gardner, 1999). These charismatic tactics can be experimentally manipulated and have strong 
effects on many outcomes (e.g., trust in the leader, affect for the leader, Antonakis et al., 2011).  
Thus, we expect that the extent to which a leader is perceived as charismatic will affect the 
extent to which this leader is perceived as leader-like and selected, because observers have well 
developed schemas that suggests that charismatic leaders are highly effective.  
Hypothesis 2: Charisma will predict leader selection.  
The Ambiguity of Performance Signals and the Rise of the Charismatic Leader: Both 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 depend on two information signals: Performance (i.e., outcomes) and 
behavioral (i.e., charismatic). We believe that these two signals interact with each other. The 
clearer the performance signal, whether positive or negative, the less likely charisma will matter 
for leader evaluation and selection. Charisma will matter less because selectors have what they 
believe is concrete evidence of the leader’s competence (or incompetence)  
Theoretically, strong performance signals are a “litmus test”; if the test is conclusive, other 
factors will not matter much in the selection decision. Whether the leader is charismatic or not is 
not of issue; the only thing that matters is if the leader has “proven” to be successful (or 
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unsuccessful) and deserves appointment (or dismissal). However, in conditions of attributional 
ambiguity (i.e., when the signal is not clearly positive or negative), selectors have to decide how 
to weight performance signals and charismatic leadership signals. It is in these situations, where 
the litmus test is inconclusive, that charisma will matter much. As mentioned by Calder (1977) 
situations where clear performance signals are unavailable are problematic for making 
attributions. Theoretically, in such situations selectors will look to the character of the leader, 
because they believe, intuitively, that charismatic leaders usually engender positive outcome. 
Thus, observers will use this information to make a judgment regarding how good the leader 
probably is, or with time will be. In this way, judgments of selectors will be influenced by the 
extent to which the leader is charismatic and this inferential process is heavily weighted in 
decision-making when performance signals are fuzzy.  
Our theory of attributional ambiguity diverts from theories of crisis. According to Max 
Weber (1947) crisis situations engender psychological distress and followers seek a leader who 
can reassure them and allay their fears; in this way “charismatic leadership has a salvationistic or 
messianic quality” (Kets de Vries, 1988: 238). However, crisis is not a needed antecedent of 
charismatic leadership (Shamir & Howell, 1999). Also, a crisis can be either indicative of (a) a 
clearly negative signal (organizational performance is bad), or (b) a time of economic or political 
volatility, or an environment that is dynamic, risky, and stressful (Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, 
Waldman, & Yammarino, 2004; Waldman et al., 2001). These two descriptions of crisis are not 
isomorphic; the former is triggered by a negative performance signal and the latter by turbulence 
(which may be accompanied by clear, usually negative, or ambiguous performance signals).  
Key to understanding how we differ from Weberian ideas is the role of performance signals, 
which will clarify who will be selected in a time of crisis. Contrary to Weberian notions, our 
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theory suggests that crisis—a clear signal of bad organizational performance—is detrimental to a 
charismatic leader if the leader is thought to be causally responsible for the crisis. Thus, the 
leader will be replaced by another leader. However, a charismatic leader will be selected in 
conditions of attributional ambiguity. Although we agree that crisis, in some situations, may ease 
the passage for a charismatic leader, our theory focuses on what will occur when organizational 
performance signals are clear or ambiguous.  
Hypothesis 3: The effect of charisma on leader selection will be moderated by the clarity of 
performance signals such that the effect of charisma (a) will be positive and significant when 
performance signals are ambiguous and (b) non-significant when performance signals are 
clear. 
TOP-LEVEL LEADERSHIP IN THE CORNER AND THE OVAL OFFICE 
Via the inferential-attribution framework, our goal is to provide an integrative theoretical 
account and empirical test of how top-level leaders are selected. We expect our theory to operate 
in and be bounded by conditions of high leader distance, where there is limited information on 
the leader because the leader is physically distant from the followers, because of high status 
differences, and/or simply because of infrequent contact between the leader and followers 
(Antonakis & Atwater, 2002). We chose two such contexts in which to test out theory: (a) the 
U.S. presidency and (b) a conventional CEO setting, using field and laboratory data respectively.  
Both political and business leadership requires social influence and organizational skills, 
which are inherent characteristics of management; in addition, both contexts reflect leadership at 
top hierarchical levels. However, at the outset they seem to be qualitatively dissimilar and entail 
different dynamics with respect to leader selection or retention. Thus, there is an important 
question to address: Is leadership in the U.S. presidential context relevant to management theory? 
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There are specificities, explained in the next section, which can be factored-out from this context 
(i.e., modeling incumbency and political party affiliation). Therefore, we highlight differences 
and similarities between these contexts, and explain how it is precisely because of these 
differences that we can ensure a clean test of our theory.  
The major difference between the leader selection process is that unlike the U.S. presidency, 
CEOs are not chosen through an explicit tournament (i.e., election); of course, when more than 
one candidate is being considered it becomes a tournament (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & 
Gangloff, 2014). Next, even if in a tournament, CEOs are not voted in by far-removed evaluators. 
Also, in political settings selectors (i.e., voters) are generally not held accountable to anyone; 
however, in business settings, selectors (i.e., boards and search committees) are accountable to a 
number of stakeholders including investors, and selectors may have other preferences or 
obligations that may constrain their selection decision. Finally, CEOs are not obliged to 
campaign for reelection at set times during their tenure. Succession events in business settings 
are usually planned or triggered because of bad organizational performance or other factors.  
Despite these differences we argue that selectors will, at a basic psychological level, still use 
the same broad decision-making mechanisms we highlight in our model; that is, selectors care 
about whether the leader is leader-like (charismatic) and whether the leader (or his/her political 
party) has presided over positive performance. Both sets of selectors have to make probabilistic 
judgments in the absence of full behavioral or attributional information. Even though it is hard to 
know precisely if the CEO or the U.S. president is fully responsible for organizational outcomes 
the leaders are nonetheless seen as responsible for them.  
We acknowledge a big difference regarding the “accountability” of selectors. Boards of 
directors are affected by personal and professional obligations from sitting on multiple boards, 
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having common social networks, or from other factors. However, we think it reasonable to 
believe that boards of directors also seek to select a competent leader who acts leader-like and 
has a good track record; thus directors also reason via the inferential and attributional paths. The 
context of the U.S. presidency does not involve such accountability dynamics—they are held 
constant in this context—thus allowing for an unconfounded test of the effects of our theory. For 
instance, factors such as seniority or one’s position within a given business network matter; 
however, these factors and others cannot be easily controlled for in a CEO context and gaining 
direct access to board members for a selection study is difficult. In addition, board members 
might not be fully transparent about their preferences and obligations for the selection decisions; 
and, indirect measures would require uncovering factors that may not leave any archival traces. 
Thus, both contexts are fair game for our model, and concern the initial decision of whether an 
incumbent leader (or in the case of a second-term president, his party) will be re-selected.  
In addition, the presidential election is exogenously determined; every four years selectors 
must judge the incumbent’s (or the incumbent’s party) economic record and then decide whether 
the leader (or the incumbent’s party) should be reappointed. Because the event trigger is 
exogenous (i.e., it follows a strict cycle), there is no possibility that unexplained variability in the 
trigger is correlated with unexplained variability in economic performance factors; therefore, the 
problem of endogeneity is avoided. Hence, data from this context will allow for consistent 
estimation of the attributional and inferential factors that predict leader selection success. In 
addition, the “organization” is held constant and we have the same performance indicators 
available over time for the organization (the U.S. economy). Such a research setting has an 
advantage over observing two (or more) candidates each associated with prior organizational 
performance involving distinct organizations, making a direct comparison of difficult to model.  
14 
Finally, the trigger to CEO succession usually follows a script that has strong parallels to 
political leadership: It begins with an observable decline in performance for which the current 
CEO  is blamed and ousted (Khurana, 2002); then comes the search for “an individual who has 
served as a CEO or president of at a high-performing and well-regarded company,” who is 
ideally charismatic too (Khurana, 2002: 20, italics added). Thus, although not a tournament, the 
incumbent is jettisoned on the basis of bad organizational performance and the savior is sought 
as a function of performance- and behavioral-based signals. This process has strong similitudes 
to leader selection in political contexts. 
To conclude, the common denominators that the two contexts share are amenable for testing 
our hypotheses. Both CEOs and political leaders are selected by individuals that use heuristic 
processes in limited information conditions. Both sets of leaders are conscious of their image 
because they are closely scrutinized by stakeholders: (a) U.S. presidents by voters, elected 
politicians in both houses, other officials, and administrators; and (b) CEOs by board members, 
investors, employees, and customers. Like Presidents, CEOs need to be concerned about being 
reappointed; although this concern is not cyclical, it will be prompted if organizational 
performance is below par. The initial reappointment assessment of an incumbent leader is 
influenced both by whether the leader is charismatic and by prior performance outcomes 
associated with the incumbent; when performance signals are ambiguous selectors will base their 
decision on how charismatic the leader is.  
STUDY 1 
We used archival data to model the outcomes of U.S. presidential elections from 1916 to 
2008. We combined country level performance and incumbency data from a well-established 
econometric model with objectively measured indicators of candidates’ charisma. The setting is 
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such that voters lack full information on the actual competence and dispositions of candidates 
and all the important economic-level factors associated with the candidates and their parties. Yet, 
they must use all available information when they cast their vote (Kelley & Mirer, 1974).  
We will model the decisions of selectors, which theoretically stem from inferential and 
attribution processes via the share of popular vote received by the candidates. That is, we assume 
that evaluations due to inferential and attribution processes reflect in voter choices. We model 
only contenders from the Democratic and Republican parties (we will exclude third party 
candidates from the model because they usually receive a very small percentage of the total vote).  
Modeling the Specificities of the U.S. Presidency to Test the Theory 
From an attribution perspective and parallel to what we have theorized, econometric models 
of voting assume that presidential candidates are evaluated on the state of the economy (Lewis-
Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). If the economy is healthy (e.g., high GDP growth, low inflation, 
which impact the labor market), electors reward the incumbent or his or her party, in the case of 
an incumbent not running again. If the state of economy is poor, voters punish the incumbent, or 
his or her party, and vote for the challenger. Thus, given party affiliation, term limits, or other 
factors, which can make for a choice between two non-incumbents, non-incumbents will be 
“made guilty” or “haloed” by complicity (i.e., party affiliation). As a striking example, and using 
only country-level economic data and incumbency data from 1916-2008, one of the most well-
established econometric model, the Fair’s presidential model (2009, 2010) explains 90.1% of the 
variance of vote outcomes (i.e., the two-party vote share considering only the Democratic and 
Republican contenders). This result provides strong support to the proposition that attributions of 
leadership can be made solely from observing the effects of leadership (Calder, 1977). 
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As for incumbency per se, the Fair (1978, 2009, 2010) model suggests that its effect cuts 
both ways. An incumbent has an advantage over the challenger because of more access to 
“airtime,” and is more familiar, and thus more recognizable (Gaissmaier & Marewski, 2011). 
However, the longer a particular party has been in power, the more weary voters will be of this 
party: The party has “overstayed its welcome.” In other words, incumbency status will predict (a) 
a higher share of the popular vote for the incumbent nominee and (b) a lower share of the 
popular vote for the incumbent party to the extent that the nominee’s party has been in power for 
a long period of time. Thus, given that that we can partial-out the idiosyncrasies of the context, 
we are able to leverage our context and sample in service of testing our theory (rather than 
forcefully testing our theory on ill-suited context and sample). 
Of course, partisanship matters a great deal too (Bartels, 2000) and most voters will 
consistently vote in line with their party affiliation. Consequently, galvanizing the party base and 
appealing to “swing voters”—those who do not identify strongly with a party—also matters 
(Mayer, 2008). Swing voters will, of course, also vote depending on the state of the economy; in 
addition, in situations of attributional ambiguity, which the econometric model ignores, we 
surmise that voters will compare candidates on charisma. In these situations, those who do not 
have strong party identification will  be unsure whether to reward or blame the incumbent on the 
basis of country-level economic performance and will be more likely to consider questions like: 
“who of the two is likely to have the better leadership skills?” “who’d make a better commander 
in chief?” or “who do I like more?” Our theory suggests that in such situations (of attributional 
ambiguity), weakly or unaffiliated voters will be swayed by the more charismatic candidate.  
To recap, when performance signals are very clear, voters will not care much about the 
incumbent’s or the challenger’s charisma; they will simply reward or punish the incumbent (or 
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the incumbent’s party if the incumbent is not running again) on the basis of the economic 
fundamentals. Incumbency provides an advantage for sitting president only if the president’s 
party has not been in power in the preceding election. Most importantly, charisma will matter 
only when the signals about the state of the economy are ambiguous. In these situations the 
contender who is more charismatic—whether challenger or incumbent—will win.  
Data and Sample 
We built our model on the most recent Fair (2009) econometric model. This model captures 
the attributional effects in which we are interested—while modeling incumbency—which we 
extend by adding the inferential (charisma) effects. Thus, the key variables in our full model are 
(a) share of votes received (indicating leader or party (re)selection), (b) performance signal 
(country-level economic performance), (c) clarity of performance signal, and (d) leader charisma. 
All data are from 1916-2008. We derived a charisma score from acceptance speeches (or 
acceptance letters before the advent of such speeches) by Democrat and Republican presidential 
candidates at their party’s national convention. We obtained the speeches from The American 
Presidency Project and from the Official Report of the Proceedings (1832-1952). We use these 
speeches because they are delivered in similar settings, allowing for a measure of comparison 
that would not have been possible to attain using other texts (e.g., debates or stump speeches). 
Also, the nomination acceptance speech has to move to the “center” of the political spectrum and 
appeal to the middle-of-the-road swing voters. Acceptance speeches arguably constitute the 
single most important speech delivered by the candidates during the election period and should 
be the speech heard or read by the greatest number of voters (either directly or indirectly through 
various media outlets); indeed, the Los Angeles Times reported that the final nights of both 
conventions each drew over 30 million live TV viewers in the U.S. (James, 2012).  
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The Fair Presidential Voting Equation 
Fair’s (1978) theory of economic voting, and its extension (Fair, 2009) models the vote share 
of the two-party U.S. presidential vote (i.e., considering only the Democratic and Republican 
contenders and excluding third parties) based on the performance of the U.S. economy and 
presidential incumbency. Predicting the two-party vote share thus simplifies the testing of the 
theory because we only need to model voter choices between two candidates. For a review of the 
theoretical framework of the model—which is beyond the scope of this paper—refer to Fair 
(1978, 2009). The latest specification of the presidential voting equation is the following model 
for election year t (for the sake of consistency, we use the same variable names as Fair): 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝑡. 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑡. 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑡 . 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑈𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  (1) 
The dependent variable is the Democrat vote-share, V. Regarding the economic variables, 
there is one a short horizon variable G, which is the growth rate (at an annual rate) of real per 
capita GDP in the first three quarters of the election year; two variables, P and Z, cover the entire 
period of the current administration up to the election. P is the absolute value of the GDP 
deflator (inflation rate at an annual rate). Z measures the number of quarters in which the growth 
rate of per capita GDP exceeded 3.2% at an annual rate; in this respect Z can be thought of as a 
“good news” variable. DPER and DUR capture two antagonistic effects of incumbency: DUR 
captures the voters’ weariness from having the same party in power (coded 0 if either party has 
been in the White House for one term, 1 [ −1] if the Democratic [Republican] party has been in 
the White House for two consecutive terms, 1.25 [ −1.25] if the Democratic [Republican] party 
has been in the White House for three consecutive terms, and so on, i.e., addition of .25 or -.25 
for each term added). DPER captures the advantage the incumbent president has as consequence 
being a familiar figure (coded 1 if a Democratic presidential incumbent is running again, -1 if a 
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Republican presidential incumbent is running again, and 0 otherwise). Because the dependent 
variable is the Democratic vote-share, the variable I is used to determine the direction of the 
effect of the three economic variables (with which it is multiplied): I = 1 if the presidential 
incumbent at the time of the election is a Democrat and I = -1 if the incumbent is a Republican. 
Finally, a dummy variable, WAR, captures the short and long-term effects specific to both world 
wars on the national economy. No other effects of wars are considered by Fair because no other 
conflicts have affected the U.S. economy in the same way. Thus, to allow for direct comparison 
with the Fair presidential voting equation, we maintain its original specification. We obtained the 
data for the 1916-2008 period from Fair (2010); all data for this study are listed in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
Extending the Fair Presidential Voting Equation with Charisma 
Because we were interested in the relative charisma difference between the two nominees, 
we used the charisma difference score between the candidates as the independent variable. To 
control for effects due to speech length (i.e., longer speeches have more opportunities to use 
charismatic tactics) we included the difference in number of sentences between the Democrat 
and the Republican speeches as a control variable. We estimated the following model: 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑡. 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑡. 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑡. 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑈𝑅 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡 
 +𝛽8𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ + 𝑢𝑡 (2) 
Where Charisma denotes the difference between the Democrat and Republican candidate 
charisma scores (C
dem
 – Crep). Thus, a positive value of charisma indicates that the Democrat 
candidate employed more rhetorical items than did his Republican counterpart. Length is the 
difference in speech length between the Democrat and Republican candidate (L
dem
 – Lrep). We 
controlled for length instead of a relative measure (i.e., Charisma divided by Length) because the 
20 
latter does not capture the number of times an audience is exposed to rhetorical signals. For 
instance, if one speech is twice as long as another, we cannot assume that the two speeches will 
have the same impact, even if they use the same proportion of rhetorical signals.  
 To test the interaction hypothesis, we extend Equation (2) to the following:  
𝑉𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐺𝑡. 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑡. 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑍𝑡. 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝛾5𝐷𝑈𝑅 + 𝛾6𝐼𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡
+ 𝛾8𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡  + 𝛾9 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑡 + 𝛾10𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡    
                           +𝛾11𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡 +  𝜑𝑡 (3) 
Where Performance Signal is defined as the ex-ante (predicted) absolute victory margin 
using only attributional information, that is, the predictions derived from Eq. 1 (see section 
“Measuring performance signals”). Performance Signal*Charisma is the interaction of the later 
variable with charisma. Thus, the test for the hypotheses in the full specification is a test of the 
following coefficients (to the extent that the directions of the effects are as predicted): 
1. Hypothesis 1: γ1, γ2, γ3 = 0 (that the economic variables matter) 
2. Hypothesis 2: γ8, γ9 = 0 (that charisma matters) 
3. Hypothesis 3: γ11 = 0 (that charisma has a stronger effect when performance signals are 
ambiguous; that is, a positive simple slope for Charisma when the value of Performance 
Signal is small and a nonsignificant slope when the value of Performance Signal is large). 
We also tested whether γ4, γ5, γ6 = 0 to determine whether the incumbency variables matter.  
Measuring charisma: We use an objective measure of charisma based on rhetorical tactics 
employed by leaders (Antonakis et al., 2011). We did not directly measure how charismatic the 
leader seems to voters because such a measure would be biased and unavailable for non-
contemporary leaders. We thus measure the projection of charisma via objectively measured 
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rhetorical skills (e.g., see Emrich et al., 2001; House et al., 1991) and assume the projection 
engendered charisma in the eyes of observers via the psychological mechanisms we discussed.  
The measure pertains to substantive statements, framing and vision creation. We list these 
tactics with a brief explanations (see Antonakis et al., 2011 for details). Framing and creating a 
vision is accomplished through (a) metaphors: simplify the message, trigger an image, aid recall; 
(b) rhetorical questions: create an intrigue and interest in knowing the answer; (c) stories and 
anecdotes: elicit an image, create identification with the protagonists, distill a message into a 
moral; (d) contrasts and comparison: define the vision in terms of what it should or should not be 
and focus attention on the message; (e) three-part lists: provide “proof” for the arguments, focus 
attention, and show completeness; Substantive statements include: (f) expressing moral 
conviction: highlights value systems and provides justification for the mission; (g) expressing the 
sentiments of the collective: showing similarity of the leader with the followers; (h) setting high 
and ambitious goals: shows ambition, aligns efforts towards goals; (i) creating confidence goals 
can be achieved: raises self-efficacy belief. In view of their complex semantic and syntactic 
structure, these items are coded by trained human coders and not by computer.  
Because the sample period goes back to the early 1900s, we did not have video and/or audio 
recordings for all the candidates. Thus, we did not code nonverbal charisma; however, indicators 
of nonverbal charisma (e.g., facial expressions, body language, use of voice) correlate strongly 
with the nine verbal strategies, (r = .48, p < .001, uncorrected for unreliablity,  Antonakis et al., 
2011). Leaders who are very expressive with words are also expressive non-verbally; thus, the 
markers we have used should capture charisma, broadly defined. Also, because candidates use 
speechwriters, a concern is that speeches might not reflect the charisma of candidates but rather 
that of speechwriters. Even if the coded rhetoric might, to a certain extent, reflect the charisma of 
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the speechwriter, nominees have an important say in developing their speech. Ultimately the 
speech will affect charismatic inference on the candidate because the candidate and not the 
speech writer delivers the speech (see e.g., Bligh, Kohles, & Meindl, 2004; House et al., 1991). 
Two graduate students coded all 48 acceptance speeches. We provided extensive training to 
the coders on practice speeches. To minimize biases from their knowledge of the candidates, we 
masked information associated candidates’ identities. For example, we concealed individual 
names (unless not used to name someone, e.g., in “the Taft Act” or the “George Washington 
bridge”), years and any mentions of party affiliation or ideology (i.e., “Republican”, “Democrat”, 
“liberal”, “conservative” and related terms). So as not to create a void in meanings and confusion 
for the coders, we left certain references that could allow the coders to identify a general period 
in time untouched (e.g., references to the “iron curtain”, “prohibition” or the “Vietnam war”). 
Each coder independently coded each speech at the sentence level for the presence or 
absence of the charismatic items. If a candidate employed a charisma item over several sentences 
(e.g., using a metaphor across two consecutive sentences), only the first sentence was coded. We 
summed the frequency of use of each charisma item to arrive at a charisma score. The coders 
correlated very highly with each other for both the Democrat (r = .90, p < .001) and Republican 
candidate (r = .89, p < 001) speeches. To ensure a maximum reliability for the charisma score of 
each candidate, we used the mean score across the two coders for analyses. The charisma and 
speech length scores are included in Table 1. We checked whether using difference scores was 
defensible (Edwards & Parry, 1993) both here and elsewhere (see below). 
Convergent validity of charisma measure: To ensure that our scores were valid indicators 
of charisma, we examined whether they converged with theoretically similar measures. We 
obtained data from six studies. Data from (a) Lichtman’s (2012) “Keys to the Whitehouse”, were 
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available for all contenders. We predicted the charisma scores of Lichtman’s model (i.e., by 
computing the difference of charisma between the Democrat and Republican nominees) using 
our charisma difference score and controlling for the difference in speech length; we also used a 
robust variance estimator. Because Lichtman coded for the presence (1) or absence (0) of 
charisma for both candidates, we model the range of scores as an ordered probit for the values of 
-1, 0, and 1 (i.e., C
Dem  
< C
Rep
 = -1; C
Dem  
= C
Rep
 = 0; C
Dem  
> C
Rep
 = 1). Results indicated strong 
convergent validity with this measure (n = 24, standardized  = .67, z = 2.93, p < 0.01).  
For the other five studies, we only found charisma data for the election winner (i.e., the 
president) and these data were not available full sample period of our study. Nonetheless, these 
data were still useful given that the measures were derived from different methods. For these 
specifications, we controlled for speech length and party affiliation, and we used cluster-robust 
standard error corrections (at the candidate level because we have different charisma scores for 
presidents who served more than one term, whereas the other researchers gave only one overall 
score). Our charisma measure was significantly related to: (b) Simonton’s (1988) ratings of 
charisma of U.S. presidents (n = 18, standardized  = .44, t = 2.20, p < 0.05); (c) Emrich et al.’s 
(2001) measure of image based rhetoric in U.S. presidential inaugural addresses (n = 18, 
standardized  = .56, t = 2.58, p = 0.01) as well as to (d) House, Spangler, and Woyke’s (1991) 
measure of charismatic effects, (n = 9, standardized  = .59, t = 3.16, p < .01) and (d) House, 
Spangler, and Woyke’s (1991) measure of charismatic behaviors, (n = 9, standardized  = .60, t 
= 3.02, p < .01).
2
 Note, for these first four studies (Emrich et al., 2001; House et al., 1991; from 
                                                 
2
 The zero-order correlation between Simonton’s (1988) ratings of charisma of U.S. presidents and Emrich et al.’s 
(2001) measure of image based rhetoric in US presidential inaugural addresses is .54; thus, we estimated the models 
for these two variables simultaneously (and hence gain in estimation efficiency). Consequently, the sample size is 
reduced to 18 observations for both models—the sample for Simonton’s (1988) ratings of charisma of U.S. 
presidents would have otherwise amounted to 22 observations (with a convergent validity estimate of .33, p < .10). 
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Lichtman, 2012; Simonton, 1988), the sample size weighted average standardized beta was quite 
high (i.e., ?̅? = .58); corrected for unreliability in our measure (Murphy & Davidshofer, 2005) and 
assuming a reliability of .80 for the other measures suggests that our measure correlates very 
highly (i.e., ?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = .71) with these other measures of charisma. Thus, there is strong 
evidence for the convergent validity in our measure of charisma. 
Finally, our measure of charisma was also related to two measures concerned with the use of 
metaphor rather than with charisma per se, which provides a useful approximation for the 
validity of our measure (uncorrected for unreliability): (e) Mio et al.’s (2005) measure of 
presidents’ overall metaphor density (n = 26, standardized  = .81, t = 5.15, p < .01) and (f) Mio 
et al.’s (2005) presidents’ metaphor density score for inspiring passages (n = 26, standardized  
= .74, t = 4.36, p < .01). Thus, there is strong evidence for the validity of our charisma measure. 
Stability of charisma measure: We examined if charisma is consistent over time and thus 
ensured that the acceptance speech is a good proxy of how charismatic a contender is in general. 
We obtained charisma scores for between two and four additional speeches from a randomly 
selected subsample of six presidential candidates. We examined whether the scores derived from 
several speeches (n = 27; including acceptance speeches) resembled each other across the 
subsample of candidates. Using a fixed-effects model with cluster robust standard errors, 
controlling for speech length, and including a dummy variable to control for the unique nature of 
acceptance speeches we find a high intraclass correlation (ρ = .33, bootstrapped SE =.15, z = 2.14, 
p < .05); note too that acceptance speeches had significantly higher charisma scores (β = 39.86, 
standardized β = .67, SE = 7.57, t = 5.26, p < .01), which shows the importance that candidates 
                                                                                                                                                             
We estimated the model with House et al.’s (2005) measures separately (in one seemingly unrelated model) because 
it would otherwise have constrained the sample size of the other models to 9 observations.  
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give to the acceptance speech. Thus, there is some evidence of consistency over time—
particularly when considering our small sample size—and the fact that candidates place a large 
emphasis on the acceptance speech. This result provides additional evidence of construct validity.  
Measuring performance signals: For the Performance Signal measure, we used the Fair 
model (i.e., Eq. 1) to estimate “out-of-sample” predictions of the Democratic vote share. An out-
of-sample prediction is a forecast that does not use the observed values for this event in 
estimation. In our case, this means that to obtain an out-of-sample prediction for election year t, 
we do not use the data for election year t to fit the model; we only use the sample data for year t 
to generate predicted estimates from the fitted model. For example, the out-of-sample prediction 
for 2008 uses 1916-2004 data to estimate the model parameters. On the basis of the fitted model, 
we generate predictions for 2008 by multiplying the estimated coefficients of the fitted model 
with the observed values for the predictors for 2008 to obtain a forecast of ?̂? for 2008. Similarly, 
the out-of-sample prediction for 1916 uses data from 1920-2008 to fit the model. Using the out-
of-sample prediction method makes for very objective model test (Meese & Rogoff, 1983). 
Model fitting and forecasting evaluation are separated and the modeler does not “cheat” by 
including the observed data of a particular year to fit the model and then predict from it.  
To generate values for the variable Performance Signal we used the absolute difference of 
the out-of-sample predictions of the econometric model (i.e., from Eq. 1) subtracted from 50% 
(i.e., Performance Signal = |𝑉?̂? − 50|). Thus, the value of Performance Signal is the predicted 
margin of victory when only considering attributional processes (the economy) and ignoring 
inferential processes (candidate charisma). Values close to 0% indicate a small margin of victory, 
showing a mitigated view of the economic fundamentals: Performance signals are ambiguous. 
As values move away from 0%, the economic signals indicate whether the economy is doing 
26 
well or not. Note that Performance Signal has sufficient variation, ranging from .24 to 14.91 
(mean = 5.02, SD = 4.44) and that for about half (i.e., 13/24) of the elections Performance Signal 
takes on values of less than 5% which would qualify these elections as close-call elections (The 
Washington Post, 2012); these are the situations where charisma should matter most. 
As a measure of convergent validity for Performance Signal, we correlated the out-of-sample 
prediction of the vote share with the actual vote share received (r(22) = .85,  p < .001; note, we 
exploit this correlation later on when estimating a two-stage least squares regression).  
Results 
Hypothesis tests: We estimated all models using Stata version 13—see Table 2. We first show 
the results of the econometric model (Model 1), to which we add Charisma and Length (Model 
2). The full model includes the performance signal-charisma interaction (Model 3).  
[Table 2, Figure 1 here] 
The results of Model 1 are the same as those presented in Fair (2010). The regression model 
predicted a large portion of the variance in the vote share (91.15%). Adding Charisma and 
Length (Model 2) improved the r-square (to 93.48%), as did the Performance Signal and the 
interaction of Performance Signal * Charisma variables (to 95.55%).  
We tested the hypotheses, using the full specification (Model 3). Hypothesis 1 was supported; 
the set of econometric variables were simultaneously predictive of the vote share as hypothesized: 
The growth variables G and Z are positive predictors and the inflation variable P is a negative 
predictor (F(3, 12) = 33.21, p < .001). With respect to the incumbency variables, they were also 
simultaneously predictive too (F(3, 12) = 18.07,  p < .001) in the expected direction (i.e., the 
incumbent variable was positive and the duration variable was negative). The result also support 
Hypothesis 2 regarding the addition of Charisma and Length (F(2, 12) = 5.35, p < .05) to the 
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model. The simple main effect of charisma alone (i.e., when Performance Signal = 0) was 
significant too (β = .13, SE = .05, p < .05). This simple main effect suggests that in a predicted 
dead-heat election charisma can make a very large difference to the election outcome (the 
standardized beta is .42). These results provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
As regards Hypothesis 3, the interaction of Performance Signal * Charisma was significant (t 
=2.26, p < .05). The form of the interaction provided strong support that charisma matters more 
when performance signals are ambiguous. Holding all other predictors constant at the means, the 
simple slope of Charisma under clear performance signals (+1 SD from the mean Performance 
Signal) was not significant (β = -.05, SE =.04, t = 1.18, p > .10). However, the simple slope of 
Charisma under ambiguous performance signals (-1 SD from the mean of Performance Signal) 
is positive and significant (β = .12, SE = .05, t = 2.47, p < .05).  
Forecasting accuracy: To show the model is not overfitted (Roberts & Pashler, 2000), we 
examined the forecasting accuracy by comparing the out-of-sample predicted values from the 
various specifications to the actual vote received and calculated the absolute error (i.e., predicted 
less actual value). Overall, our models (i.e., Models 2, 3 and 4, see next) perform substantially 
better than does the Fair model (i.e., Model 1). The mean absolute error (MAE) for Models 2, 3, 
and 4 is 2.70, 2.76, and 2.90 respectively, whereas it is 2.85 for the Fair model (see Table 1).  
We can also compare if the election is “called” correctly (a practically-useful outcome). 
Model 3 correctly identifies the winner in 21 out of 24 elections; the hit rate for Model 1 is 17 of 
the 24. Interestingly, and confirming our theorizing about the importance of clear performance 
signals, the actual winning margin of the correctly called elections in the cases where Model 1 
was right was Actualcorrect = 7.30% (SD = 3.60) with an average predicted winning margin for 
this model at Predictedcorrect = 6.58% (SD = 4.35); however, the actual winning margin of those 
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elections that were incorrectly called by this model was only Actualincorrect = 1.37% (SD = 1.27) 
with an average predicted winning margin for this model at Predictedincorrect = 1.22% (SD = 1.22). 
Thus, when Model 1 predicts the election will be close (i.e., the performance signal is ambiguous) 
it actually is close and this is when this model is likely to get it wrong because it ignores 
individual differences in times of attributional ambiguity (note Actualcorrect > Actualincorrect, t 
=4.21, p < .001; Predictedcorrect > Predictedincorrect, t = 3.17, p < .01). 
As an additional and more basic check for the interaction hypothesis we looked at the 
predictive accuracy of Model 2 (the model without the interaction but with Charisma) versus 
Model 1. Model 2 called 21/24 elections right, whereas Model 1 got 17/24 right (likelihood ratio 
2(1) = 8.52, p < .01). We then compared hit rates for the 13 elections predicted to be a close call 
(i..e, < 5% victory margin, The Washington Post, 2012). Model 2 got 10 correct, whereas Model 
1 only got 6 correct. This difference was significant (likelihood ratio 2(1) = 4.49, p < .05). 
Overall, these results provide converging evidence in support for Hypothesis 3.  
Robustness checks for endogeneity: There are two concerns with endogeneity for the estimates 
of Performance Signal and Charisma. First, although Performance Signal is theoretically 
exogenous with respect to V (vote share), endogeneity could bias results because we use an ex-
ante estimated regressor that has some degree of uncertainty in it. We thus reestimated Model 3 
(referred to as Model 4 for this analysis) using two-stage least squares analysis (2SLS) 
(Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). To do so, we need to have an instrument—an 
exogenous sources of variance that cannot possibly vary as a function of omitted causes in 
Performance Signal or V. We used the actual margin of victory as our instrument, because it is 
perfectly observed and an absolute value of victory for either one of the parties it is exogenous to 
V. We therefore estimate the model with robust standard errors “instrumenting” Performance 
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Signal and Performance Signal * Charisma with the actual margin of victory, its square and cube 
as well as the interaction of these three variables with Charisma, and included the rest of the 
variables as exogenous regressors (see Wooldridge, 2002 for how to instrument for endogenous 
interactions). The instruments were “strong,” the overdidentification test nonsignificant (2(4) = 
2.53, p > .10),and the endogeneity test of Performance Signal and Performance Signal * 
Charisma indicated that they were endogenous with respect to vote share (Hausman, 1978); still, 
because the 2SLS point estimates (reported in Model 4, Table 2) did not differ from the Model 3 
OLS estimates, as indicated by a Wald test (2(12) = 14.27, p > .10) we retain the OLS estimates. 
All hypothesis tests were nonetheless still supported using 2SLS, and the interaction pattern was 
similar.  
Second, it is possible that the charisma of political candidates is determined by—rather than 
caused by—expected or previous electoral outcomes rending estimates inconsistent (Antonakis 
et al., 2010). Perhaps the political party that has lost the previous election, or which is more 
likely to lose the current election as a result of economic and incumbency factors, selects a more 
charismatic candidate to reverse the electoral outcome. In order to test for this potential reverse 
causality, we regressed Charisma on the predicted values from Model 1; we also regressed 
Charisma on the actual vote share from the previous election (while controlling for Length). 
Both results were non-significant, indicating that charisma is exogenous to such selection effects.   
Robustness check for r-square: Because of the small sample size, we checked if Model 3 does 
better than chance in terms of variance prediction. We used two Monte Carlo simulations, to see 
how a model having the same n-size and k-predictors would do under different conditions. The 
first simulation used normally distributed random variables. For the second simulation we used 
the observed correlation matrix of the data for Model 3 from which we calculated the mean 
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absolute correlation between the 12 variables. The mean correlation was .28. To err on the side 
of caution, we created a correlation matrix manipulating the mean correlation between the 
variables at .30, .40 and .50. Then, we introduced random “shocks” in each predictor by adding 
x*e to each variable (where x was manipulated from .1 to 1, and where e is a normal distributed 
random variable with a mean of 0 and a SD of 1). We crossed the two manipulations and ran 
both simulations 1,000 times (for n = 24). The highest upper boundary of the 95% confidence 
interval we obtained was .58; the lower 95% bootstrapped boundary of Model 3’ r-square 
was .93, which was significantly higher that .58 (2(1) = 819.16, p < .001). Given the out-of-
sample forecasts and the simulation evidence, it is unlikely that Model 3 is “overfitted.” 
Predicting the 2012 election (ex-ante): To forecast the 2012 election (done prior to the election), 
the two authors independently coded the nomination acceptance speeches of Barack Obama and 
Mitt Romney. We coded each sentence for the presence or absence of the nine charismatic tactics. 
Obama’s speech had 1,908 coding events (212 sentences * 9 coding categories); Romney’s had 
2,430 coding events (270 sentences * 9 coding categories). Agreement statistics (Landis & Koch, 
1977) on the two codings indicated strong agreement (κObama = .69, SE = .02, z = 30.28, p < .001, 
agreement = 94.81%; κRomney = .67, SE = .02, z = 33.28, p < .001 agreement = 96.63%). We 
obtained very similar findings when combining both speeches or when only examining 
agreement for each of the 9 coding categories. We therefore averaged the final scores of the 
coders. Obama received a score of 177.5; Romney’s was 131 (charisma difference = 46.5).  
We used forecasts of economic data from approximately two months and two weeks before 
the election (Fair, 2012); we report predictions for Models 1 and 3 from two weeks before the 
election (substantive projections for two weeks and two months prior were the same). Model 1 
predicted that Obama would lose the popular vote with 49.05% (SE = 1.76, z = 27.81, p < .001, 
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90% CIs 45.97 to 52.13). Evidently, the election was too close to call on the basis of this model 
as some commentators noted (New York Times, 2012), reflecting the then mitigated view of the 
economy. We used the Model 1 prediction to compute the value of the Performance Signal (i.e., 
|49.05097% - 50%|= .94903%) for Model 3. This model showed that Obama would win 55.50 % 
of the two-party vote (SE = 2.88, t = 19.25, p < .001, 90% CI’s 50.37 to 60.64). We tested 
whether 55.50% differed from 50%; this result suggested that it was unlikely that Obama would 
lose this election (F (1, 12) = 3.65, p = .08). Model 4 (2SLS) predicted 57.79% for Obama (F(1, 
12) = 13.59, p < .001 for Δ from 50%), who  actually received  51.96% of the two-party vote. 
Brief discussion 
Controlling for the idiosyncrasy of the context of the U.S. presidential election, results of this 
study suggest that when performance signals are ambiguous, leaders are selected on the basis of 
how charismatic they are. However, when performance clearly positive (or negative), 
incumbents or their parties are rewarded (or punished) at the next elections. Although the effects 
of charisma were quite strong, they should be lower-bound estimates to the extent that politicians 
face intense competition before being nominated by their party to run for the presidential race.  
STUDY 2 
Although Study 1 made a relatively strong case for external validity, we could only assume 
that inferential and attributional processes drove these results. Here we used an experimental 
design to directly test the effect of these two psychological processes. Using realistic stimulus 
materials, we tested if our theory explains retention decisions about an incumbent CEO.  
Materials and procedure 
We designed a TV business report, Business Line, portrayed by actors and professionally 
produced to provide an ecologically valid context to manipulate information about a company’s 
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performance and the charisma of its CEO. We asked participants to watch the newscast, which 
profiled a fictitious U.K.-based company called BlueTech. The news anchor introduced the 
report stating that there were recent increased trade volumes in the firm’s stock and that investors 
were wondering whether to buy, hold, or sell their stocks. He then spoke to a reporter from the 
London Stock Exchange about BlueTech’s stock price who in turn conveyed analysts’ recent 
recommendations. The anchor then read a statement from the CEO of the firm regarding recent 
happenings, and then interviewed a former employee (a financial analyst) of the CEO.  
Given the focus of the newscast, we manipulated CEO charisma (high vs. low) and firm 
performance signals (either clearly good, ambiguous, or clearly poor), resulting in 2 x 3 between 
subjects experimental design. We thus created six versions of the stimulus video—with each 
version of the video lasting approximately four minutes (e.g., for the charismatic CEO condition 
with good company performance see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zN1RPthANFA). We 
hosted the videos on a private YouTube channel and embedded them in Qualtrics. Participants 
only accessed one condition. After watching the newscast we asked participants to suppose they 
were on the board of directors of the company and then to vote on whether the current CEO 
should be reappointed or replaced; it is this decision that we model as the selection decision.  
Participants 
Our usable sample was 717 (47.84% women) U.S. participants recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. These participants were thoroughly screened on appropriate control questions 
and memory checks regarding the content of the videos (cf. Mason & Suri, 2012) and were on 
average 32.65 years old (SD = 11.45). They represented all 20 industries listed in the North 
American Industry Classification System (United States Census Bureau, 2013) and all 50 states. 
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Most (58.17%) had a received a college degree; 31.94% occupied at least a managerial position 
and 42% of participants owned stocks or mutual funds. 
Manipulated variables 
CEO charisma: We manipulated CEO charisma in three ways: (a) directly through the CEO 
statement read by the anchor—in terms, of how many charismatic rhetorical tactics were used 
(i.e., six vs. none; note, both versions of the CEO statement had the same number of sentences 
and words); (b) indirectly via how others described the leader in this case by the news anchor, 
and (c) indirectly through descriptions about the CEO in an interview given by a former 
employee of the CEO (cf. Bligh, Kohles, & Pillai, 2011; Meindl, 1990).  
Firm performance signals: We manipulated firm performance through (a) presenting stock 
price over the last quarter on a graph where it was either increasing by 8%, decreasing by 8% or 
being almost constant (ambiguous signal), (b) analysts’ recommendations (buy, hold, sell), and 
(c) the recommendations of the finance specialist interviewed on the show (buy, hold, sell). 
Manipulation checks 
To verify participants’ perceptions of CEO charisma, we used the MLQ’s idealized influence 
(attributes), idealized influence (behaviors) and inspirational motivation scales (Avolio, Bass, & 
Jung, 1995). We measured leader effectiveness with the MLQ’s effectiveness scale. Cronbach 
alpha reliabilities of the four scales were .91, .89, .94 and .89. We then regressed each of the 
scales on the respective manipulated factor (note, all F-tests below are heteroscedastic robust).  
Results showed that for idealized influence (attributes), the mean of the charismatic CEO 
condition was higher than that of the non-charismatic one (mean = 2.88, SD = .83 vs mean = 
1.06, SD = .77, model F(1, 715) = 928.10, p < .001, r-square = .57). The results for idealized 
influence (behaviors) (mean = 2.70, SD = .83 vs mean = 1.23, SD = .82, model F(1, 715) = 
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572.24, p < .001, r-square = .44), and inspirational motivation were similar (mean = 3.43, SD 
= .72 vs mean = 1.21, SD = .90, model F(1, 715) = 1345.96, p < .001, r-square = .65). For 
effectiveness, the means of the three conditions differed as a function of performance cues 
(meannegative = 1.51, SD = .90, meanambiguous = 1.79, SD = 1.08, meanpositive = 2.53, SD =  .94, 
model F(2, 714) = 73.65, r-square = .16; contrast F(2, 714) = 55.29, p < .001, all p-levels 
Bonferroni adjusted). These results suggest that the manipulations had their intended effects. 
Results 
Using a linear probability model (LPM) with a heteroscedastic-robust estimate of the 
variance, we regressed the binary variable—reflecting whether the CEO should be reappointed—
on the manipulated variables, Charisma and Performance Cues and the interaction (the omitted 
category was Ambiguous Performance cues). We used a LPM instead of a probit regression 
because the LPM is a consistent estimator of binary outcome models having marginal effects 
isomorphic to the observed coefficients (cf. Moffitt, 1999); predicted probabilities and 
differences in marginal effects using the probit regression, nonetheless gave the same results. We 
probed the interaction effects using post-estimation tests (e.g., testing differences in predicted 
probabilities), which we undertook using the delta method. Refer to Table 3 for the results.  
 [Table 3] 
The regression model predicted CEO reappointment. The effects of Performance Cues 
were significant in the full model (F(2, 711) = 53.30, p < .001), and main effects contrasts 
showed that negative cues significantly decreased the likelihood of CEO reappointment as 
compared to ambiguous cues (F(1, 711) = 12.39, p < .001); likewise, positive cues significantly 
increased the likelihood of leader reappointment with respect to ambiguous cues (F(1, 711) = 
91.99, p < .001). These results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. In addition, the main 
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effect of Charisma was significant too in the full model (F(1, 711) = 82.29, p < .001) as was the 
main effect contrast (F(1, 711) = 152.95, p < .001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 2.   
The Charisma*Performance cues interactions were jointly significant (F(2, 711) = 5.46, 
p < .01). Compared to the omitted category, the coefficient of Charisma*Negative Performance 
cue was lower though not significantly so; the Charisma*Positive Performance cue coefficient 
was significantly lower. A more powerful test using a linear combination shows that the average 
coefficient of the two clear performance signals conditions each interacted with charisma was 
significantly lower than the omitted category ( = -.18, SE = .07, t = 2.76, p < .01). This finding 
provides strong support for Hypothesis 3a: The effect of charisma on leader reappointment is 
significantly positive and higher than when performance signals are ambiguous.  
We probed the interaction by generating predicted values (Figure 2). Unexpectedly, and 
as also shown by the main effect result, Charisma had a significant effect on leader selection in 
both clear performance signal conditions: The difference in predicted probabilities between 
Conditions 2 (.53) and 1 (.16) was significant (Cond.2-1 = .37, SE = .06, t = 6.56, p < .001) as it 
was too between Conditions 6 (.96) and 5 (.70) (Cond.6-5 = .26, SE = .05, t = 5.65, p < .001). Of 
course, the difference in Conditions 4 (.74) and 3 (.24) was significant also (Cond.4-3 = .50, SE 
= .06, t = 9.07, p < .001). As indicated previously, the effect of Charisma on selection in the 
ambiguous performance signal condition was significantly higher than that in the other two 
conditions (i.e., Cond.4-3  > (Cond.2-1 + Cond.6-5)/2, F(1, 711) = 7.63, p < .01; note, √7.63 = the t-
statistic of 2.76 in the above paragraph).  
[Figure 2 here] 
Using a more fine-grained analysis, we tested if the predicted probabilities differed 
from .50 (i.e., a random choice). In all conditions, save one (Condition 2), the difference of the 
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predicted probability from .50 was significant (Bonferroni adjusted tests). Thus, even though 
charisma did help the leader in Conditions 2 vs. 1, it still did not help the leader enough. These 
results provide some support for Hypothesis 3b, namely that charisma has an insufficient (albeit 
a positive effect) on leader selection when performance signals are negative; however, contrary 
to what we expected charisma does have a positive effect on selection when performance signals 
are positive, though the effect is comparatively smaller than in the ambiguous condition.  
Finally, our “litmus test” argument suggested that in Conditions 1 and 2, the leader 
should not be reappointed; the predicted probability across these conditions was .32 (< .50 F(1, 
711) = 28.79, p < .001). Similarly, in Conditions 5 and 6, the leader should be reappointed; 
predicted probability across these two conditions was .83 (> .50 (F(1, 711) = 251.61, p < .001). 
In addition, our theory also suggests that Conditions 1, 2, and 3, characterized by negative 
performance signals, or no charisma in the presence of ambiguous performance signals, should 
have a detrimental effect on leader selection as compared to Conditions 4, 5 and 6. These latter 
conditions have positive performance signals, or a charismatic leader along with ambiguous 
performance signals. The linear combination of estimators showed that the mean predicted 
probability across conditions 1, 2, and 3 (i.e., .31) was significantly below .50 (F(1, 711) = 69.91, 
p < .001). The mean predicted probability of Conditions 4, 5, and 6 (i.e., .80) was significantly 
above .50 (F(1, 711) = 213.79, p < .001). Moreover Probability(Cond. 1, 2, 3) < Probability(Cond. 4, 5, 6) 
(F(1, 711) =  56.73, p < .001). These results provide further support for Hypothesis 3
3
. 
Robustness checks 
                                                 
3
We also asked participants how they would apportion a $1,000 investment between BlueTech stock and low-risk 
government treasuries. Charisma had the greatest effect under conditions of attributional ambiguity. With a non-
charismatic leader, subjects allocated 20.27% of their monies to company stock; with a charismatic leader the 
allocation was 30.58% (i.e., 50.89% higher). There was no effect of charisma in the positive performance signal 
condition; however, charisma had a strong effect in the negative performance signal condition, increasing the 
allocation by 42.10% (from 13.17% to 22.75%). Participant job-level did not affect findings. 
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We checked for the effect of job level because employees at lower levels may not 
understand the dynamics of top-level leadership, market indicators, or investment issues. Thus, 
we interacted all the job level dummy variables (i.e., k – 1) with performance cues, charisma, and 
the performance cue-charisma interactions; the main effect of job level as well as the interaction 
coefficients of job-level remained insignificant (F (20, 691) = 1.35, p > .10).  
Brief discussion 
Experimental evidence, using high fidelity video material provided further evidence that 
charisma matters much more in conditions of attributional ambiguity than in conditions where 
performance signals of the leader’s organization are clearly positive or negative. This finding 
suggests that similar psychological mechanisms underlie the evaluation and selection of top-level 
leaders, whether in the political or business arena. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Our results demonstrate that charisma’s effect is most evident when performance signals are 
ambiguous; that is, inferential processes matter most in conditions of attributional ambiguity. 
Applied to the first context in which we tested our model, the U.S. presidency, our results show 
that the charisma of political candidates matters and significantly improves the prediction of the 
Fair model particularly when performance signals are unclear (i.e., in predicted close call 
elections). We replicated these results using an experimental design in a business context, 
showing that reappointment of a CEO for participants acting as board members depended both 
on attributional and inferential process; the latter, in particular mattered most when performance 
signals are ambiguous. Participants in the role of investors reacted similarly, which suggests that 
decision mindsets for selection and investment choices are similar.  
The experimental results showed that charisma increased the likelihood of CEO 
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reappointment across all performance conditions. Although charisma matters most in ambiguous 
performance conditions, our expectation that it would not matter under clear performance signals 
was not supported; charisma mattered though to a lesser degree. Moreover, following our “litmus 
test” argument we found that clear negative performance signals significantly reduced the CEO’s 
chances of reappointment. When performance signals were clearly positive, the CEO’s chances 
of reappointment were significantly increased. Although our model offers a refined view 
allowing us to make predictions about leader selection when inferential and attributional signals 
are not pointing in the same direction it seems that a leader positively (or negatively) assessed 
through both inferential and attributional routes will be more (or less) desirable than one who is 
only positively (or negatively) assessed through only one of these two routes. 
In the case of high-level leaders who are distant from observers, our results underscore 
the importance of observer category-based information processing using markers of charisma.  
Indeed, it is through effective image-building and discourse that leaders communicate their 
vision, but also build an aura about themselves that is inextricably bound to the vision. Our 
results also partly reconcile theories claiming leadership is an attribution versus those claiming 
that leaders matter. Leaders do have a role in affecting organizational performance, as field 
experiments manipulating leadership have shown (Antonakis et al., 2010). The halo effect from 
performance cues is not just illusionary. Our study cannot speak to this part of the argument 
because we cannot discern if top-level leaders matter for country (or firm) performance; still we 
know there is strong causal evidence indicating that leaders can even affect country economic 
performance (Jones & Olken, 2005). Interestingly, and based on findings from Study 2, the 
coefficients of the dummy variables of cue on ratings of three MLQ charisma scales was 
significant (2(6) = 30.36, p < .001) taking the mean r-square across the equations from .55, 
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when only the charisma dummy was included, to .59. Yet, the simultaneous linear combination 
of cues was insignificant (β = .20, SE =.15, z = 1.33, p > .10) and that of manipulated charisma 
was higher (β = 1.76, SE =.08, z = 21.40, p < .001) and significantly so. Thus, the “romance bias” 
on ratings of leadership in our data was minimal. Coupled with the results of the CEO decision 
choice, our findings show that something “in” the leader affects evaluations beyond performance 
cues, which in turn matter much for leader selection when performance signals are clear. If 
selectors are unsure about how well the organization is doing, they will infer how competent the 
leader is based on how charismatic the leader appears.  
Our findings also shed light on charisma per se in situations that may or may not be 
characterized as crisis. As we argued, attributional ambiguity is not necessarily reminiscent of a 
crisis and such situations do not necessarily give rise to charismatic leaders. The phenomenon we 
have identified is something unique and could contribute to advancing our understanding of 
leadership, and other phenomena where performance is evaluated: For example, work or 
interview performance is a situation wherein a target sends signals to an evaluator via attribution 
and inferential channels. How these signals are pondered should largely follow our theorizing—
inferential signals will matter much when attributional signals are ambiguous. Consider the case 
of hiring recently minted Ph.D.’s for a faculty position: Because many applicants may not have a 
well-developed publication record (i.e., performance signal) an important part of the selection 
decision will be based on how they sell themselves in the job talk and interview, which will rely 
on factors like their charisma and communication skills, declarative knowledge of the field and 
so forth. Of course, those that have a demonstrated publication record (or a bad record) will have 
an advantage (or a disadvantage) if they are charismatic too (or regardless of their charisma).  
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These findings, applied to leadership, also have important practical implications for 
leaders—who should project strong charisma in times of attributional ambiguity and also 
associate or dissociate themselves from performance signals depending on whether the signals 
are positive or negative—but also for evaluators who should carefully consider whether they are 
correctly pondering inferential and attributional information. Evaluators could be unduly affected 
by charismatic targets in situations where performance-based information is ambiguous. Thus, it 
behooves evaluators to try and obtain concrete information about targets’ true competence.  
Our results should apply to situations where top leaders are evaluated and information on 
prior performance and leader prototypicality is available. For example, when boards of directors 
select CEOs they usually will have a short-list of candidates along with information on (a) how 
the firm they managed performed, as well as (b) on how charismatic they are (from personal 
observation and from the reports of others who have seen, heard, or read about the CEO). Thus, 
although there is no direct tournament, several candidates may be considered and the inferential 
and attributional dynamics we identified will surely play a role in the selection decision.  
There are other situations to which the model would apply, for example in how top-level 
leaders are selected by a tournament for associations or professional bodies (here performance 
signals might not be economic but outcomes like the evolution in the number of members). The 
model could also be extended to cases where more than two candidates are vying for office.  
Reflections on U.S. presidential leadership 
Given the unique context of Study 1, our theory not only benefitted from studying 
political leaders, but it can also help explain how political leaders are judged. For example, our 
results challenge the prevailing wisdom regarding  Obama’s victory in the 2008 U.S. presidential 
election—apparently Obama won because of his charisma as suggested too by scholars (e.g., 
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Bligh & Kohles, 2009). We disagree: If we estimate Model 3 for the case of a 2008 race in which 
a Democrat President had been in office for the two previous terms ceteris paribus (i.e., we 
reverse the incumbency record for the two past terms), we would predict a Republican victory 
(35.08% Democrat vote share). Similarly, for the case of a 2008 election for which the economic 
conditions had been very good ceteris paribus (i.e., inputting values of our model economic 
variables one standard deviation above the sample mean), our model again predicts a Republican 
victory (42.01% Democrat vote-share); Obama’s charisma would not have shifted the balance. In 
any case, the econometric model (Model 1) predicted a Democratic victor in 2008 while ignoring 
the charisma difference of the candidates. The economic signals did suggest—in a relatively 
strong way—a Democratic margin of victory of 5.78% (which is slightly above the mean of the 
predicted margins of victory for Model1). So, despite Obama’s charisma surplus, these models 
suggest that Obama did not win because of his charisma but partly because of the 
macroeconomic performance conditions in which the election was contested.  
Still, charisma makes a large difference in close-call elections (e.g., 2012). Interestingly, 
most of the polls had Romney ahead for most of October 2012. The economic model suggested 
that it would be close election (and that Obama would lose). The economic conditions were 
mitigated and sent ambiguous signals: The economy was growing, but not strongly, and inflation 
was low. It appears that the reason why Obama defied political gravity and won the election was 
because he had an incumbent advantage, and because he was more charismatic than Romney was.   
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Our model can be extended for any general case where evaluators evaluate (or select) 
using attributional and inferential decision processes. Thus, we hope to see studies that can 
obtain data on inferential and attributional mechanisms to predict CEO or political successions 
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using field data, particularly given the limited sample size we had in Study 1. Experimental 
studies should also consider modeling business situations that include more than one candidate 
vying for a position of CEO—for example, an incumbent CEO and an apparent “challenger” (i.e., 
one who is being considered for the incumbent’s position). Other interesting designs could 
include manipulating objective leader expertise and responsibility in performance outcomes.  
With regard to boundary conditions, national culture, which affects the aforementioned 
psychological process (Morris & Peng, 1994) should moderate the model as could other 
contextual factors (Liden & Antonakis, 2009). For instance, “close” observers might not use 
heuristics much. Yet it is hard to get close to top-level leaders. Although boards of directors, who 
select CEOs, might decide in a more individuating fashion, they still do not work on a day-to-day 
basis with CEOs and part of the information they get on the CEO is staged (in board of directors 
meetings, shareholders addresses, etc.). They also receive information about the CEO’s 
performance indirectly (accounting reports, share prices, etc.). In addition, boards may also 
anticipate what distant outsiders like shareholders and analysts—who are affected by CEO 
charisma (Fanelli, Misangyi, & Tosi, 2009; Flynn & Staw, 2004)—will expect of a CEO. 
Director decisions could, therefore, be partly explained by our model.  
CONCLUSION 
We extended established leader evaluation and selection paradigms by fusing two distinct 
theories. We tested the model in a political as well as a standard business context. Through the 
lenses of attributional and inferential processes, we proposed that selectors evaluate leaders 
based on prior organizational performance for which these leaders are thought to be causally 
responsible. However, we showed too that selectors use information on leader prototypicality, 
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charisma, in conditions of attributional ambiguity. Such mixed-models should provide better 
explanations as to why leaders are selected and might prove useful in other performance domains.   
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TABLE 1 
Data and predictions from the Fair and the extended Presidential Equation (Study 1) 
Yr. 
Democrat 
candidate 
Republican 
candidate 
V I DPER DUR WAR G P Z C
dem
 C
rep
 L
dem
 L
rep
 ?̂?𝒂 ?̂?𝒃 
1916 W Wilson CE Hughes 51.68 1 1 0 0 2.23 4.25 3 40 46 182 354 49.46 50.78 
1920 J M Cox WG Harding 36.15 1 0 1 1 -11.46 0 0 1 61 6 266 47.24 39.34 
1924 J W Davis C Coolidge 41.74 -1 -1 0 0 -3.87 5.16 10 58.5 40.5 241 362 43.01 40.03 
1928 A Smith H Hoover 41.24 -1 0 -1 0 4.62 0.18 7 45.5 41.5 328 200 43.41 44.11 
1932 FD Roosevelt H Hoover 59.15 -1 -1 -1.25 0 -14.59 7.16 4 46 68 189 339 64.91 64.19 
1936 FD Roosevelt A Landon 62.23 1 1 0 0 11.84 2.48 9 42 56.5 102 212 64.18 61.74 
1940 FD Roosevelt W Willkie 54.98 1 1 1 0 3.90 0.08 8 50.5 58 137 338 55.75 52.64 
1944 FD Roosevelt T Dewey 53.78 1 1 1.25 1 4.23 0 0 20.5 30.5 67 131 50.82 53.14 
1948 HS Truman T Dewey 52.32 1 1 1.50 1 3.64 0 0 26 36.5 146 78 49.56 52.28 
1952 A Stevenson D Eisenhower 44.71 1 0 1.75 0 0.73 2.35 7 21.5 19.5 72 49 45.72 46.18 
1956 A Stevenson D Eisenhower 42.91 -1 -1 0 0 -1.45 1.90 5 43 43 143 183 43.88 44.00 
1960 JF Kennedy R Nixon 50.09 -1 0 -1 0 0.46 1.94 5 50.5 85 122 179 48.44 49.89 
1964 L Johnson B Goldwater 61.20 1 1 0 0 5.09 1.27 10 43 72 127 122 60.78 60.23 
1968 H Humphrey R Nixon 49.43 1 0 1 0 5.05 3.13 7 60 80.5 138 254 50.60 50.77 
1972 G McGovern R Nixon 38.21 -1 -1 0 0 5.95 4.80 4 51.5 57.5 105 209 42.42 40.85 
1976 J Carter G Ford 51.05 -1 0 -1 0 3.81 7.63 5 61.5 47.5 140 171 49.41 56.21 
1980 J Carter R Reagan 44.84 1 1 0 0 -3.66 7.86 5 68 80 247 203 46.41 48.05 
1984 W Mondale R Reagan 40.88 -1 -1 0 0 5.42 5.25 8 46.5 88.5 190 287 37.24 30.60 
1988 M Dukakis GHW Bush 46.17 -1 0 -1 0 2.21 2.96 4 84.5 118.5 119 295 49.76 47.55 
1992 B Clinton GHW Bush 53.62 -1 -1 -1.25 0 2.95 3.31 2 102 83.5 280 319 46.15 48.88 
1996 B Clinton B Dole 54.74 1 1 0 0 3.26 2.03 4 70.5 87 354 320 52.74 51.38 
2000 A Gore GW Bush 50.26 1 0 1 0 2.01 1.64 7 86 88.5 311 303 49.03 51.28 
2004 J Kerry GW Bush 48.77 -1 -1 0 0 1.99 2.25 1 123 74.5 317 275 43.95 44.12 
2008 B Obama J McCain 53.69 -1 0 -1 0 -2.26 3.05 1 93.5 80 210 284 55.78 56.16 
                 
Note: The values of P for 1920, 1944, and 1948 before multiplication by zero are 16.535, 5.690, and 8.480, respectively, and the values of Z are 5, 14, and 5 
(Fair 2010). Winner of popular vote in boldface. C
dem
 = charisma score of Democrat candidate; C
rep
 = charisma score of Republican candidate; L
dem
 = number 
of sentences of the Democratic candidate’s speech; Lrep = number of sentences of the Republican candidate’s speech; ?̂?𝑎 is the out-of-sample prediction from 
the fair model (see Eq. 1); ?̂?𝑏 is the out-of-sample prediction from our full model (see Eq. 3). Underlined values in ?̂?𝑎 and ?̂?𝑏 refer to wrong out-of-sample 
predictions (i.e., 7 for the Fair model and only 3 for Model 3; Model 4, not included above, had 3 wrong predictions). 
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TABLE 2 
Regression Estimates (Study 1): Predicting vote-share 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
G·I .67** .64** .71** .74** 
 
(6.22) (6.33) (7.03) (9.90) 
P·I -.65* -.86** -.47 -.21 
 
(2.31) (3.08) (1.50) (.68) 
Z·I .99** .90** 1.03** 1.10** 
 
(4.30) (4.14) (5.10) (6.23) 
DPER 2.92* 2.31† 2.17† 2.17** 
 
(2.18) (1.83) (1.86) (2.66) 
DUR -3.41* -4.32** -3.96** -3.71** 
 
(2.87) (3.70) (3.74) (4.70) 
I -1.91 .39 -2.09 -3.64 
 
(.85) (.17) (.89) (1.57) 
War 5.06† 5.11* 7.12** 8.45** 
 
(1.99) (2.19) (3.10) (4.34) 
Charisma  
 
.03 .13* .19** 
  
(1.20) (2.49) (4.88) 
Length 
 
.01 .00 -.00 
  
(1.21) (.27) (.52) 
Performance Signal  -.44* -.68** 
   (2.19) (4.99) 
Performance Signal*Charisma   -.02* -.03** 
   (2.26) (6.13) 
     
Constant 47.38*** 48.05** 49.79** 50.71** 
 
(77.55) (74.92) (49.33) (65.55) 
  
   
Root MSE 2.50 2.29 2.04 1.57 
R
2
 .91** .93** .96** .95** 
ΔR2 F-test   2.50 2.78 19.15** 
     
 
**p < .01, *p < .05, †p < .10; n = 24; sample period: 1916-2008; t-statistics in parentheses; Columns 
1-3 OLS regression models reporting unstandardized estimates for Models 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
Column 4 reports results from the 2SLS model. The ΔR2 F-test compares the change in r-square to the 
previous (constrained) model (for model 3, ΔR2 F-test for the interaction alone is F(1, 12) = 5.13, p < 
.05). The significance of the parameters and joint tests remain unchanged with robust standard errors 
for Model 3. Note, because our dependent variable V is bounded we reestimated the models using a 
fractional logit model with robust standard errors; we also estimated the models using quantile 
(median) regression, which is robust to outliers, to approximate the conditional median. The overall 
pattern of results using these two modeling approaches produced the same substantive results (with 
higher levels of significance).   
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TABLE 3 
Regression Estimates (Study 2): Predicting CEO retention 
 
 
Variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
          
Negative cue -.13** 
 
-.14*** -.08 
 
(2.97) 
 
(3.45) (1.51) 
Positive cue .36*** 
 
.35*** .47*** 
 
(8.87) 
 
(9.54) (8.17) 
Charisma 
 
.39*** .38*** .50*** 
  
(11.27) (12.34) (9.07) 
Charisma*Neg. cue 
   
-.13 
    
(1.62) 
Charisma*Pos. cue 
   
-.24** 
    
(3.30) 
Constant .47*** .36*** .29*** .24*** 
 
(14.94) (14.23) (9.42) (6.35) 
     R-squared .17*** .15*** .31*** .32*** 
ΔR2 F-test    5.46** 
     
 
*** p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05; n = 717; robust t-statistics in parentheses; Columns 1-4 report 
unstandardized estimates for linear probability model for models predicting the selection 
decision. Change in r-square is for comparing models in Columns 4 and 3.  
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FIGURE 1 
Interaction Between Strength Of Performance Signals And Charisma Difference Using Model 3 (Study 1) 
  
 
Note: Prediction from the fitted values of Model 3; “Performance signals” refers to the predicted margin of victory  using only economic and 
incumbency data (Model 1). The simple slope for “clear performance signals” is not significant; that of “ambiguous performance signals” 
positive and significant. The simple slope for “mean performance signals” is not significant. 
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FIGURE 2 
Interaction Between Performance Signals And Charisma (Study 2) 
 
Note: estimates are from a linear-probability model with heteroscedastic-robust estimate of the variance. Probit model predicted 
probability and marginal difference were the same as above. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the prediction. Numbers at 
prediction points are labels for the six experimental conditions. 
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